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As a general rule, government employees provide most services paid for with
tax revenues, such as the police, the military, operation of prisons, fire
departments and schools, collection of garbage, and so on. Yet in some cases,
these senices are privatized through government contracting out their provision
to private suppliers. The choice between Lnhouse provision and contracting out
has proved to be quite controversial. Advocates of government contracting point
out that private suppliers deliver public services at a lower cost than public
employees (Savas 1982, 1987, hgan 1990). The critics of government contracting,
while quibbling with these figures, stress that the quality of public services
that private contractors deliver is inferior to that delivered by public
employees (AFSCME 1985, Shichor 1995). In this paper, we develop a theory of
government ownership and contracting that may throw lighten the cost and quality
of service under alternative provision modes.
The perspectivewe adopt is thatof incomplete contracts (Grossman and Hart
1986, Hart and Moore 1990, Hart 1995). Suppose that apublic-spirited politician
chooses between having a senice delivered by a public agency and contracting it
out . In the first case, the politician has to hire some public employees, and
give them employment contracts specifying what they need to do. In the second
case, the politician has to sign a contract with a private supplier who in turn
contracts with his employees. If the politician can sign a complete or
comprehensive contract (with either employees or a contractor), he can achieve
the same outcome in each case. From the traditional incentive viewpoint,
motivating the contractors and the public employees presents the same problem to
the politician even in the presence of qoral hazard and adverse selection. TO
understand the costs and benefits of contracting out, we need to consider a2
situation where contracts are incomplete and where residual rights of control in
uncontracted for circumstances are important in determining agents’ incentives.
The assumption of contractual incompleteness is not hard to qotivate once
it is recognized that the quality of semice the government wants often cannot
be fully specified. Indeed, critics of privatization frequently appeal to the
argument that private contractors would cut quality in the process of cutting
costs because contracts do not adequately guard against this possibility.
Critics of private schools fear that such schools, even if paid for by the
government (e.g., through vouchers), would find ways to reject expensive-to-
educate children, who have learning or behavioral problems, without violating the
letter of their contracts. Critics also worry that private schools would replace
expensive teachers with cheaper teachers’ aides, thereby jeopardizing the quality
of education. In the discussion of public vs private health care, the pervasive
concern is that private hospitals would find ways to save qoney by shirking on
the quality of care or rejecting the extremely sick and expensive-to-treat
patients. In the case of prisons, concern that private providers hire




key objection to privatization, Fear that contracts cannot
quality is at the heart of many debates over government
In some cases, the problems of contractual incompleteness make the case for
in-house provisionby the government straightfomard. For example, a gove~ent
would not contract out the conduct of its foreign policy because unforseen
contingencies are a key part of foreign policy, and a private contractor would
have enormous power to qaximize its own wealth (by, for instance, refusing to
send troops somewhere) without violating the letter of the contract. If the3
government wants such a contractor to do something different, it would have to
pay possibly huge amounts to renegotiate the contract. Put differently, getting
the right level of quality out of a private contractor might be very expensive,
On the other hand, for senices provided on a routine basis, with relatively few
surprises, contracts can be made relatively complete. For example, contractual
incompleteness does not play an important role in garbage collection or towing ‘
of automobiles, and great sacrifices of quality are not likely to come from cost-
cutting by private contractors. On the other hand, the efficiency gains from
cost-cutting may be substantial. For these services, therefore, the normative
case for privatization is compelling. It is also important to recognize that,
for many activities, such as just about any industry, private contractors deliver
both lower costs and higher quality. As a general rule, government ownership is
a mistake on both margins. Our qodel tries to explain both why private
contracting is generally cheaper, and why in some circumstances it may deliver
a higher, while in others
government.
Many discussions of
a lower, quality level than inhouse provision by the
privatization lump together the issue of public or
private ownership with the issue of competition. That is, those who advocate
privatization often do so on the grounds that private ownership allows the
benefits of competition to be reaped. We believe that the identification of
privatization with competition is misleading. In principle, it is possible to
have several government-owned firms competing to supply the public, or several
qanagement teams competing for the right to run a government enterprise (e.g. ,
a prison). It is also possible to have a private firm with no effective
competitors (a monopoly). Our analysis is based on the idea that the fundamental
difference between private and public ownership concerns the allocation ofresidual control rights,
Competition may strengthen
does under some conditions-
4
rather than the degree of competition per se.
the case for privatization--in fact we show that it
-but only because the allocation of residual control
rights is different under privatization. In this paper we deal with the role of
competition only briefly, although we believe that this is a very important topic
for future research.
In the next section of the paper,
contracting which focuses on these quality
we present a model of government
issues. The basic idea of the model
is that the provider of the senice -- whether a government employee or a private
contractor -- can invest his time to improve the quality of the service or to
reduce its cost. The cost reduction, however, has an adverse effect on quality.
Neither innovation is contractible ex ante. However, both types of innovation,
to be implemented, require the approval of the owner of the asset, such as a
prison, a hospital, or a school. If the provider is a government employee, he
needs the government’s approval to implement either improvement, since the
government retains residual control rights over the asset. As a result, the
employee receives only a fraction of the returns to either the quality
improvement or the cost reduction. Moreover,
a goveruent employee can be compensated for
employee is replaceable.




In contrast, if the provider is a private contractor, he has the residual
control rights over the asset, and hence does not need to get the government
approval for a cost reduction. At the same time, if he wants to improve quality
and get a higher price, he needs to negotiate with the government since the
government is the buyer of the senice. However, he is no longer replaceable.
As a consequence, the private contractor generally has a stronger incentive to5
engage in either qulity improvement or cost reduction than the government
employee. But, the private contractor’s incentive to engage in cost reduction
is typically ~ strong since he ignores the adverse impact on quality.
We analyze this qodel in Section 3 and establish several propositions
concerning the relative efficiency of inhouae provision and government
contracting. In general, the bigger the adverse consequences of (non-
contractible) cost cutting on (non-contractible) quality, the stronger is the
case for inhouse provision. The efficiency of inhouse provision also turns on
the strength of the incentives of government employees, and on the importance to
the government of generating quality innovations. We show in Section 3 that the
conclusions emerging from the model are generally extremely intuitive, including
the result that private provision is generally cheaper, but may generate either
higher or lower quality. Section 3 also briefly addresses a key omission from the
model, namely the possibility of ex post competition between contractors, which
typically strengthens the case for privatization.
The basic qodel in Section 2 deals with a benevolent government. Many of
the concerns about government contracting, however, deal with the reality of a
less than perfect government, in which politicians are corrupt or interested in
favoring their political supporters to attract votes. In section 4, we argue
that public corruption creates a bias toward excessive privatization, whereas an
interest in votes of public employees creates the reverse bias. With selfish
politicians, the efficiency of alternative arrangements turns on which failure
of the public sector is the most important.
In section 5, we apply the framework of sections 2-4 to discuss
privatization of prisons. Should the government contract out the operations of
prisons to private firms, who then have power over incarceration and treatment6
of convicts? Private prisons have been growing rapidly in the United States,
although they still hold only about 3 percent of prisoners, Critics voice a
strong concern about the quality of private incarceration, including the quality
of prisoner life, the incidence of prison violence by inmates and use of force
by guards, escapes, and to a lesser extent rehabilitation.
The analysis of prison privatization fits nicely into our framework.
Although many aspects of quality can in fact be contracted for, and prison
contracts tend to be rather elaborate documents, significant contractual
incompleteness remains. For example, it is hard to write a contract completely
specifying the conditions for the use of force by guards, since the
circumstances under which force is justified are subject to interpretation.
Private contractors, then, might use force excessively to restrain prisoners if
this reduces costs. Even more important, it is difficult to specify in the
contract the quality of employees, such as guards and managers, that a private
contractor hires. Hiring cheaper employees (within the limits set by the
contract) can save a private contractor q oneybut is likely to reduce the quality
of prisoner treatment. hst but not least, some recent evidence indicates that
the government’s ability to write and enforce the best possible contract should
not be taken for granted. Overall, the theoretical results of sections 3 and 4,
when combined with the available evidence, suggest some skepticism about the
wisdom of prison privatization.
Our results qay help in thinking about other government services as well.
In particular, the parameters of the q odel, namely the adverse quality effects
of cost reduction, the importance of quality innovation, and the incentives of
government employees, as well as possibilities of competition which we do not
formally model, may shed light on the wisdom of privatization of such activities7
as defense procurement, garbage collection, police and armed forces, education,
and health. In section 6, we discuss in qore general terms the applicability
of our framework to the study of government contracting.
Ours is certainly not the first normative analysis of gover~ent
contractin~. Some of the issues addressed in our paper are raised in the now- ,
classic book by Wilson (1989). Economists working in this area have generally
focused on traditional adverse selection and moral hazard problems raised by
contracting (hffont and Tirole 1993, Tirole 1994), as well as on competitive and
anti-monopoly problems following privatization (Vickers and Yarrow 1988). Some
recent studies have examined contractual incompleteness (Schmidt 1996, Shapiro
and Willig 1990, bffont and Tirole 1993), Unlike our work, they have emphasized
informational losses from contracting or the costs of having multiple bosses.
Theoretically, our paper is new primarily in reemphasizing the role of incomplete
information in contracting, and emphasizing the critical importance of quality
issues. In this regard,
Milgrom (1991, 1994) who,
providing an agent with
profits, can lead to his
our paper is related to the work of Holmstrom and
in a comprehensive contracting framework, note that
strong incentives to pursue one objective, such as
shirking on other objectives, such as quality. Our
framework is different from theirs, although at a very general level the issues
we are interested in are similar. In addition, the existing literature is
primarily theoretical, and does not go into too much detail about the problems
of specific sectors, such as prisons3.
‘There is also a considerable literature on positive aspects of
contracting; see e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Savas (1982, 1987).
%ere are some exceptions. For example, Vickers and Yarrow (1988)
discuss the possible decline in quality at British Telecom following
privatization and price cap regulation. Domberger, Hall and Li (1995) examine
the consequences for price and quality of contracting out cleaning se~ices.2. The Model
Basic Assumptions
In this section we present a simple model of the choice between the public
and private provision of a good, such as prison, hospital, or school services.
Suppose that society, represented by the government, wants a certain good
or semice to be provided. We assume that consumers cannot buy this good
directly in the marketplace, e.g., because it is a public good.4 One
possibility is to contract out the provision of this good, e.g., the government
can write a contract with a private company to run a prison for five years. A
second possibility is to provide the good ‘in-house,” e.g. , the government can
arrange for public employees to run the prison. The qodel is based on the idea
that the crucial distinction between these arrangements concerns who has residual
rights of control over the nonhuman assets used to provide the service--we call
these assets the “facility F“ (e.g., the prison). If the good is publicly
provided, then the government (represented by a bureaucrat), as owner, has
residual control rights over the facility. If the good is privately provided,
then the private provider, as owner, has residual control rights over the
facility. Residual control rights matter because they determine who has the
authority to approve changes in procedure or innovations in uncontracted for
contingencies.5
4This assumption qakes good sense in the case of prisons but is more
controversial in the case of schools or hospitals.
‘See Grossman and Hart (1986). What may be qore important is not who
owns the physical prison, but who has the right to use it (perhaps for a
restricted period of time). For exemple, the government qay own the prison,
but sell the right to operate it to a private company for n years (a
franchising arrangement). In this case, the private company has residual
control rights during the n year period. In this paper, we do not distinguish
between physical ownership and possession of the right to use the prison.9
We suppose that the facility--public or private--is run by a single
manager/worker, M. There is also a single bureaucrat or politician, represented
byG. We start by considering the case where the bureaucrat perfectly represents
the interests of society, i.e., there is no agency problem between the bureaucrat
and society.6 hter we consider self-interested bureaucrats and politicians.
We assume that G and M are able to write a long-term contract specifying
some aspects of the good or service to be provided and the price. In fact, we
suppose that a long-term contract is required in the case where F is private in
order to support relationship-specific investments. 7 We call the good thus
described in the contract the “basic” good and denote its price by PO. PO has
different interpretations according to whether the facility F is private or
public . If F is private, i.e., M owns F, then PO is the price that M as an
independent contractor receives for providing the basic good. If F iS public,
i.e., G 0-S F, then PO is the wage that M receives as an employee. In the
latter case provision of the basic good can be regarded as part of M’s job
description, i.e., M does not get paid unless he provides the good.
Although G and M can specify some aspects of the good or senice in
advance, we suppose that there are others that they cannot specify. We have in
mind that various contingencies can arise which call for some qedification of the
%0 be more precise, we assume that G’s utility function is given by the
welfare of the rest of society, excluding M. A justification for this is that
the political process aligns G’s and society’s interests (since M has
negligible voting power his interests receive negligible weight). As will
become clear, if G’s utility encompassed M’s interests as well, the first-best
could be achieved.
‘We do not qodel these relationship-specific investments explicitly.
However, they might correspond to physical investments, e.g. , building the
prison. We have in mind that the owner qust incur these investment costs
since if a non-owner incurs the cost he can be held up by the owner. For the
idea that a long-term contract is required to support relationship-specific
investments, see Kleinet al. (1978) and Williamson (1985).10
basic good. For instance, H can suggest a way to modify the prison to increase
security. Alternatively, H may find a way to reduce costs by hiring cheaper (or
fewer) guards. Our assumption is that there are so many possible contingencies
ex ante that it is impossible to anticipate them all and contract on how to deal
with them in advance.* Instead the parties revise the contract ex post once it ,
is clear what the relevant contingencies are. We refer to the basic good
modified to allow for relevant contingencies as the “modified good.”
The modified good yields a benefit B to society and costs the qanager C to
produce. C is a cost borne directly by M. For example, B might be the social
benefit from having a prison with few fights between inmates and well fed and
healthy prisoners. Although B camot be measured or verified (it does not show
up in any accounts), we suppose that it can be represented by a dollar amount.
Similarly, C can be represented in dollars.
The manager can q anipulate B andC through prior effort choices. We assume
that M can devote effort to two types of “innovation” relative to the basic good:
a cost innovation and a quality innovation. We suppose that a cost innovation
leads to a reduction in costs C but is typically accompanied by a reduction in
quality (i.e., B). Similarly, a quality imovation leads to an increase in
quality, but is typically accompanied by an increase in costs. Specifically, we
write:
B-BO - b(e) + ~(i),
C-CO-c(e),
8 For a further discussion, see Hart (1995).11
where e, i denote effort devoted to the cost innovation and quality innovation,
respectively; c(e)> O is the reduction in cost corresponding to the cost
innovation; b(e)z O is the reduction in quality corresponding to the cost
imovation; and ~(i) z O is the quality increase net of costs from the quality
innovation. The function b plays a key role in this model: it qeasures how ,
much (non-contractible) quality might fall because of a (non-contractible) cost
cut , and hence se~es as the variable that critics of privatization focus on.
We make standard assumptions about the convexity, concavity, and
monotonicity of b, c and ~: b(0) -O, b’ zO, b“ zO; c(O) -O, c’(O) -=, C’
>0, C“<o, C’(m) -o; p(cj)-(), p’(o) --, p’ >(), p“ <cl, p’(m) -o; c’ -
b’ z O. Note that the assumptions c’-b’ z 0, ~’ > 0 say that the quality
reduction from a cost innovation does not offset the cost reduction; and the cost
increase from a quality innovation does not offset the quality increase. The
former, in particular, is an important substantive assumption, since one can
imagine in principle that cost cutting by a contractor (e.g., failing to train
prison guards) produces social damage in excess of cost savings. Our assumption
rules out these cases, although they can be easily analyzed.
The manager’s ex ante effort cost must be added to C to get M’s overall
costs . We write total effort costs as e + i, and assume a zero interest rate (no
discounting) . Hence H’s overall costs are
C+e+i-CO-c(e)+e +i.10
%e need to keep track of the separate cost and quality components of the
cost imovation (c and b), but not of the quality innovation.
10 In an earlier version of this paper, we assumed a more complicated
cost-of-effort function in which e and i were substitutes (along the lines of
the q ulti-tasking work of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)). The current qodel
generates simpler and easier-to-interpret results.12
One important assqtion we make is that both the cost and quality
innovations canbe introduced without triggering a breach of the contract for the
basic good. That is, although each innovation leads to a change in quality (in
the case of the cost innovation, a reduction in quality), the initial contract
is sufficiently vague or “incomplete” chat neither innovation violates it.
We also assume that i, e, b, and c are obse~able to both G and H, but are
not verifiable (to outsiders) and hence camot be part of an enforceable
contract. Similarly, G’s benefits and H’s costs are obsenable, but not
verifiable or transferable, which means that revenue and cost-sharing
arrangements are infeasible.ll
We suppose that G and M are at least partially locked into each other once
their relationship is underway. Specifically, there is no facility other than
F available that can supply society and there is no other potential customer for
the service (e.g., a prison) apart from G, However, H’s labor semices may be
partially substitutable (see below). Finally, we assume that M and G are risk
neutral and that there are no wealth constraints. A time-line is presented in
Figure 1.
Default Payoffs
As noted, the parties want to renegotiate the contract at date 1 once they
learn the nature of potential quality improvements and cost reductions. we
assume that G and M divide
bargaining, i.e., they split
the gains from renegotiation according to Nash
the surplus 50 : 50. This means that the parties’
default payoffs- -that is, what occurs in the absence of renegotiation-- influence
llFor a qore extensive discussion of verifiability, noncontractibility,
and revenue and cost-sharing arrangements, see Hart (1995).13
final payoffs.
We take the point of view that any cost or quality innovation requires the
agreement of the owner of the facility F, since iqlementing these innovations
involves a change in the way F is used. Only the owner (the possessor of the
residual control rights) has the right to approve such a change. Thus, in the
case of a public facility, G needs to agree to any cost or quality innovation,
whereas, if the facility is private, M can implement these innovations without
G’s agreement. However, even if the facilty is private, it is not in M’s
interest to Introduce a qwlity innovation without the approval of G since no
payment will be forthcoming for an uncontracted-for quality improvement unless
G agrees to qake it, i.e., unless a new contract is written.
It remains to discuss the extent to which the fruits of M’s efforts e and
i are embodied in M’s human capital, Suppose that if M has an idea about how to
reduce costs or increase quality then a fraction of the benefits of this idea
requires M’s participation but the remainder can be realized without M because
some aspects of M’s ideas become public knowledge (at least within the
organization) . In particular, assume that, in the case where F is public, G can
realize a fraction O s (1 - A) s 1 of the net social gains -b(e) + c(e) + B(i)
from imovation without M by hiring a different manager and paying him at cost.
If F is private, G can obtain none of these benefits since M has the residual
control rights and can prevent any innovations. The parameter 1 is very
important, since it effectively measures the weakness of the incentives of
government employees. In the case 1 - 1, the public employee (warden) is
irreplaceable, and hence can command the
negotiation with G as a private manager.
We can sum up the above discussion
same share of the total rents in the
as follows:14
(A) If F is privately owned, then, An the absence of
the cost innovation is implemented (since
it is in H’s interest to implement it and M has the
residual control rights) but the quality imovation is
not (since no payment from G will be forthcoming). That
is, G’s default payoff is BO - PO - b(e) am~’s default
payoff is PO - CO + c(e) - e - i.
(B) If F is publicly owned, then, in the absence of
~ene~otiation, both cost and quality innovations are
implemented. However, G qust replace M and hence gets
only a share (1 - i) of the gains from these
imovations. That is, G’s default payoff is BO - PO +
(1 - A) [c(e) - b(e) + ~(i)] and H’s default payoff is
Po - co - e - i“
me First -Best
It is useful to consider as a benchmark the first-best situation where e
and i are contractible (or equivalently, where long-term contracts describing the
modified good can be written). In this case G and H would choose e and i to
maximize the total net surplus from their trading relationship, and divide the
surplus between them using lump-sum transfers. That is, in the first-best, G and
M solve:
(2.1) Max (c(e) -b(e) +~(i) -e-i),
e,i15
Given our assumptions, (2.1) has a unique solution (e*, i*), characterized by
first order conditions:
(2.2) -b’(e*) + c’(e*) - 1,
(2.3) fi’(i*)-1.
At the social optimum, the marginal social benefit of spending extra effort to
reduce costs, measured to take account of marginal quality deterioration, must
equal the marginal cost of that extra effort, which equals 1. Similarly, the
marginal social benefit of spending extra effort to improve quality qust equal
the q arginal cost of that extra effort, which again equals 1.
Fauilibriwuner pri d vate OwnershiD
Suppose Mowns F. Then in lightof (A), the renegotiation takes place over
the quality innovation. The gains from renegotiation are ~(i), which are split
50 : 50. (There is symmetric information about i.) Thus, the parties’ payoffs
are
(2.4) UG-BO- PO + 1/2 O(i) - b(e),
(2.5) u“-Po- CO+ 1/2 P(i) + c(e) - e - i.
Note that because M can reduce costs without seeking G’s approval, G bears the
full brunt of quality deterioration resulting from cost reduction.
Since the parties are assumed to have rational expectations, M chooses e
and i to maximize UH, that is, to solve16
(2.6) W (1/2 P(i) + c(e) - e - i).
e.i
Denote the (unique) solution by (eH, iM) (where H stands for ovnership by H).
The first order conditions for (2.6) are
(2.7) c’(eH) - 1,
(2.8) 1/2 p’(i”) - 1.
There are two deviations from first-best here. First, M ignores the
deterioration of quality resulting from cost reduction, and hence exaggerates the
social benefit of cost reduction. Second, because M qust get G’s approval to
implement a quality improvement, on the q argin he gets only half the benefits of
that improvement, which stunts his incentive to improve quality.
The total surplus, SH, under M’s ovnership is then given by
(2.9) SM -U6+UM-B0 -CO- b(eM) + c(eM) + P(iM) - eN - i~.
The price PO is chosen to allocate this surplus between the parties according to
their relative bargaining positions at date O. The formula for S“ reflects the
fact that the parties bargain efficiently ex post, but there is a distortion in
relationship-specific investments e and i.
Equilibrium un er Pu d blic OwnershiD
Suppose G ovns F. Then in light of (B) the renegotiation takes place over
the fraction 1 of both the cost and quality innovations that G cannot17
appropriate: A[-b(e) + c(e) + ~(i)]. The gains are split 50 : 50, and so the
parties’ payoffs are
(2.10) UG-BO-PO+(l - A/2) [-b(e) + c(e) + ~(i)],
(2.11) u“ - P. - CO+A/2 [-b(e) +c(e) + ~(i)] - e - i.
Note that, in the case A - 1, when the qanager is completely irreplaceable, the
parties split the gains from innovation 50 : 50. M chooses e and i to solve
(2.12) - (A/2 [-b(e) + c(e) + $(i)] - e - i).
e,i
Denote the (unique) solution by (eG, i~) (where G stands for ownership by G).
The first order conditions for (2.12) are
(2.13) 1/2 (-b’(eG) + c’(e~)) - 1,
(2.14) 1/2 p’(i) - 1.
In contrast to the private ownership case, because the publicly-employed M needs
to negotiate the cost reduction with G, he takes account of quality reductions
that may result from cost-cutting innovations. However, there are new
distortions in the case of public ownership. First, for both quality and cost
innovation, the public manager needs the approval of G and hence surrenders half
the gains from trade. Second, if Z< 1, the public qanager can be replaced, and
hence has even weaker incentives to innovate. Both of these factors stunt a18
public manager’s incentives.
The total surplus, SG, under G ownership is then given by
(2.15) SG -U6+UM-B0 -CO- b(e~) + c(e~) + P(iG) - e~ - i~.
Again the price PO is chosen to allocate the surplus at time O according to
relative bargaining power.
Be choice of WershiD Structure
The optimal ownership structure is the one that produces the largest total
surplus (the division of surplus can always be adjusted through po). mat is,
(2.16)
G ownership is superior to M ownership
- SG > SH
- -b(eG) + c(e~) + #(iG) - e~ - i~> -b(eM) + c(e”) + p(i~) - eM - ‘“.
Renegotiation under symmetric information ensures that all ownership structures
yield an ex post efficient outcome. The only difference between the ownership
structures concerns the choice of the ex ante investments e and i.
3. Analysis of the Optimal Ownership Structure.
A comparison of (2.1) and (2.6) shows that private
distortions relative to the first-best. First, M ignores
noncontractible quality b(e); in other words, that he
effort to reduce costs. Second, M places 50% weight on
ownership leads to two
the fact that e reduces
damages G through his
the gains from quality
innovation ~(i) as opposed to 100% weight. It follows immediately from the19
first-order conditions (2.2), (2.3), (2.7), (2.8) and concavity that e is
inefficiently high and i is inefficiently 10U under private ownership.
~. ~>e*, iM< i*.
The private ownership equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2.
Consider next public ownership. A comparison of (2.1) and (2.12) shows
that under public ownership, M does worry about the damage b(e). The reason is
that M cannot implement the cost reduction without G’s permission and so they
bargain about the net surplus -b(e) + c(e) from the cost-reducing innovation.
However, H places weight A/2 on the gains from cost innovation -b(e) + c(e) and
on the gains from quality innovation ~(i), as opposed to 100% weight in the first
best, It follows from the first-order conditions (2.13)-(2.14) that e and i are
both inefficiently low under public ownership. Moreover i is lower under public
than under private ownership unless i - 1, i.e., unless M is irreplaceable.
~ronosition ~. e~ < e*, IG s iM < i* (with IG < iH unless 2 - 1).
The public ownership equilibrium is also illustrated in Figure 2.
The trade-off between public and private ownership is now fairly clear.
Private ownership leads to an excessively strong incentive to engage in cost
reduction (eM > e*) and to moderate-- although still too weak--incentives to
engage in quality improvement (IH < i*). Public ownership removes the excessive
tendency to engage in cost reduction but replaces this with a weak incentive to
engage in both cost reduction and quality improvement. Which arrangement is
superior therefore depends on which distortion is less damaging.20
The next two propositions provide conditions under which private ownership
and public ownership can be ranked.
proposition 1. (1) Suppose the function is replaced byeb(e), wheree >0.
Then for O sufficiently small private ownership is superior to public ownership.
(2) Suppose the function is replacedby Oh(e) and the function
c(e) is replacedby ~(e), where 6, # > 0. Then, for 0, ~ sufficiently small and
A < 1, private ownership is superior to public ownership,
Part (1) of Proposition 3 follows from the fact that, as O - 0, the damage
to quality from cost reduction disappears. Under these conditions, private
ownership leads to the efficient choice of e (since c’(e) = -b’(e) + c’(e)).
Since the level of i is always closer to the first-best under private ownership
than under public ownership, private ownership dominates public ownership. Part
(2) follows from the fact that, as 0, ~ - 0, e*, eM and e~ all converge to zero.
Thus # only the choice of i qatters; private ownership is better than public
ownership because it yields a level of i closer to i*.
Proposition 3 has a very natural interpretation. There are basically two
cases when private ownership is unambiguously superior. The first case is when
the deterioration of quality from cost reduction is small. In this case, the
stronger incentives that a private contractor has to reduce costs ~ improve
quality are both desirable. The second case is when the opportunities for cost
reduction (and hence the damage to quality as well) are small and the
government employees have relatively weak incentives (1 is small). In this case,
the private contractor would not do much of the potentially damaging cost
reduction, and his stronger incentive to make quality innovations gives him the21
edge over inhouae provision. Both of these are extremely intuitive cases.
The cases where inhouse provision is superior are given by the following
result:
~. (1) Suppose -b(e) + c(e) - od(e), where o > 0. Then for o
sufficiently small and A sufficiently close to 1, public ownership is superior
to private ownership.
(2) Suppose -b(e) +c(e) -ad(e), where 0>0. suppose also that the
function ~(i) is replacedby t~(i), where f>O, nen for a, t sufficiently small
public ownership is superior to private ownership.
Part (1) follows from the fact that as a - 0 the social gains from cost
reduction converge to zero: the quality damage fully offsets the cost savings.
Thus the weak incentives for cost reduction under public ownership are socially
efficient. In contrast, the incentives for cost reduction under private
ownership are inefficient, since the private owner ignores the substantial damage
b(e) . If 1 is close to 1, the incentives for quality innovation under public
ownership are similar to those under private ownership, and so public ownership
dominates private ownership.
Part (2) replaces the condition A close to 1 with the condition that t is
small. In this case i*, i“ and ic are all approximately zero and so only the
choice of e matters. For a small public ownership is superior to private
ownership because it delivers a socially more efficient level of e.
Proposition 4 as well has a very natural interpretation. Public ownership
is most likely tobe better when the adverse effect of cost reduction on quality
is large. But that is not enough. For public ownership to be definitely22
superior it qust also be the case that either quality improvement is unimportant
or that government employees do not have weaker incentives in quality improvement
(1 is large). If one
are not significantly
is preferred.12
of the latter conditions holds, then private contractors
superior at improving quality, and hence public ownership






are always lower under private ownership. Quality may be
private ownership.
We know that e is higher under private ownership than under public
ownership (eM > e* > eG) and hence costs are always lower under private
ownership. Quality -b(e) + ~(i)
higher, so is i. One case where
qay be higher or lower since, although e iS
quality is higher under private ownership is
when b’(e) is small (more precisely, we replace b(e) by 6b(e) and let 9 - O);
12We have analyzed private ownership under the assumption that the
private owner actually manages the firm. This is not a bad assumption for the
case we are most interested in--prisons. In future work, however, it would be
useful to extend the analysis to situations where there is a separation
between ownership and control. Some of the most important trade-offs that we
have identified are still likely to be relevant. Note in particular that it
will still be the case that the owners and managers of a private firm have an
excessive tendency to reduce costs, since they can collectively divide the
gains from cost reduction among themselves, ignoring the adverse quality
impact on society. The implications for quality innovation are more
complicated. To the extent that the manager of a private firm is less
replaceable than the manager of a public firm (because the private company’s
shareholders are dispersed, say), the private company manager’s incentives to
innovate will be greater than the public q anager’s. However, to the extent
that the manager of a private firm must share the fruits of his innovation
with both his owner(s) and the government, as opposed to just the government,
the private manager’s incentives to innovate will be smaller (on the latter
effect, see kffont and Tirole (1993) and Hart and Moore (1990)).23
then quality is determined by differences in i and not differences in e. On the
other hand, if P’(i) is smll, quality is higher under public ownership; in this
case quality is determined by differences in e rather than differences in i,
Proposition 5 explains what we believe to be the basic stylized facts,
namely that private contracting typically yields greater cost efficiency, but
there is ambiguity about quality. Note that we could not get ambiguity if we
had a simpler model, in which there is no investment in quality improvement. In
that q odel, there would be a straight tradeoff between quality and cost, with
public provision delivering more quality at a higher cost. That qodel (i.e.,
one without ~) would resemble the comprehensive contracting treatment of Laffont
and Tirole (1993, chapter 4), who argue that higher powered incentives (which
mightbe associated with private ownership) lead to both lower costs @ quality.
Our model, in contrast, explains why in some -- arguably most -- cases private
provision leads to both lower costs and higher quality.
Competition
Perhaps the single qost important issue that our qodel does not deal with
is ex post competition between the suppliers of the good. Competition may not
always be a relevant option. For example, letting prisoners choose their prison
and having prisons compete for inmates is probably a bad idea. However, in other
cases, competition might be very beneficial.
To take the simplest case, suppose that the consumers buy the good, or
senice, directly from a contractor, without any government intervention, even
in financing. Suppose also that the consumers can assess the quality on their
own (a good assumption with most goods, a plausible assumption for education, and
probably the wrong assumption for health). Suppose finally that the suppliers24
are perfectly competitive at every quality level. In this case, a private
contractor would face exactly socially optimal incentives, since, on the margin,
he gets a lower price for any quality shortfall
and a higher price for any quality improvement
receives -b(e) + c(e) + ~(i)). Private supply
best. On the other hand, a public manager needs
the government, and might be replaceable, so
resulting from a cost reduction,
through imovation (that is, he
in this case delivers the first .
to negotiate any innovation with
his incentives to innovate are
stunted. In this extreme case -- where there is no need for the government at
all -- the private sector delivers the first-best and public provision is
inefficient. Competition makes the choice between the qode of supply trivial.
Of course, in qost interesting cases, the situation is more complicated,
and some government role is needed, at least in financing. For example, in
education, even if the suppliers are private and competitive, most arrangements
would allow for the government to pay for the senice of at least some consumers
(e.g., through vouchers). The idea is that the government needs to participate
in the financing of these se~ices to reduce inequality of consumption across
consumers. In these arrangements, as long as consumers can assess quality, it
is still likely that, to the extent that there is consumer choice and competition
between suppliers, private suppliers would pay for deterioration in quality
resulting from cost reduction because the consumers can go elsewhere. In this
case, competition again generally strengthens the case for contracting out.
The objections to private, competitive supply typically focus on more
subtle distributional issues. One argument is that private suppliers paid a
fixed sum by the government would refuse to supply consumers who are expensive
to senice (e.g., they would not educate difficult children). Another argument
is that, under private arrangements, sorting that is inefficient from the socialviewpoint would result
leaving other children
sometimes -- though not
25
(e.g., good schools would only accept smart children,
to bad schools). As we argue in section 6, it is
always -- possible to come up with private, competitive
contractual arrangements that can successfully address these distributive
concerns. However, we leave a full discussion of competition and regulation to .
a separate paper.
4. Alternative views of government.
In this sectionwe relax the assumption that thebureaucrat/politician acts
on behalf of society, that is, we allow for the possibility that the politician
is self-interested. This self-interest can express itself in a number of ways.
First, the politician qay be corrupt, in the sense of being willing to use his
control rights to extract qoney (or campaign contributions) for himself from the
contractor. Second, the politician may use his control rights to pursue
political objectives other than the public interest, such as catering to interest
groups that qight support him in the election. These alternative
characterizations of political behavior have significant implications for the
optimality of alternative ownership structures.
Corruption
A corrupt politician overseeing the delivery of a government senice can
benefit himself in many ways. If the service is contracted out, the politician
can try to award the contract to a supplier who does not qake the lowest bid or
who delivers a lower quality, in exchange for a bribe. The politician can also
write a contract that is disadvantageous, e.g. , one that intentionally ignores
important quality issues or pays excessive prices. When such a contract needs26
to be renegotiated, the politician can renegotiate it on terms advantageous to
the contractor. bst but not least, once the contract is awarded, the politician
may accept the violation of its terms, and fail to enforce important provisions.
In short, a corrupt government official can use a variety of powers at his
disposal to reduce the qwlity and raise the cost of senrices to the government,
and collect bribes in exchange”.
We do not analyze all these models of corruption in this paper. Instead,
we describe one simple -- but possibly important -- case, in which corruption
leads to an excessive tendency to privatize. That 1s, a corrupt official
privatizes when in-house provision is socially preferred.
Suppose the privatization decision is made by a higher level politician at
some date before date O (see Figure 1). That 1s, assume that the time line is
as in Figure 1 except that the ownership decision is made at date -%. Suppose
also that the politician is not involved in F’s operations after the
privatization decision, that is, contracting decisions pass to a bureaucrat who
is assumed to be honest. In contrast, the politician is corrupt and takes
q onetary bribes.
Under these conditions the politician has a simple choice. He can
privatize F (a prison) --in which case he arranges to sell it to a private
company owned by M (the future owner-manager of F). Suppose that the politician
can set the price artificially low and extract a bribe from M, i.e. the
politician can avoid selling F through competitive bidding. Alternatively, the
13A very similar set of issues arises when the politician is lazy or
unmotivated. Such a politician, like his corrupt counterpart, may write bad
contracts that fail to protect the public, award contracts to inefficient
suppliers, pay excessive prices, fail to supervise contractors, etc. Because
privatization locks the government into these bad arrangements, laziness of
politicians, like corruption, tends to point against privatization.27
politician can keep F public and appoint M as the future manager (the warden).
In this situation ve suppose that the politician can extract a bribe from H in
return for M’s future benefits as manager.
Under reasonable assumptions the politician can extract amuch higher bribe
if he privatizes F than ifhe does not. If the politician privatizes F then, at
date O, H is in a bilateral bargaining position vith the bureaucrat G concerning
the terms of the contract. The total surplus to be divided is given from (2.9)
by SM . Under the assumption of Nash bargaining, M receives hSM through the
price PO. Now qove back to date -k. At this date, as long as there are many
potential (identical) firms and managers who can run the prison, the politician
can offer to sell F to whomever pays the highest bribe: the highest bribe is of
course %SN and so this is the politician’s payoff.
Now consider the case where the politician keeps F public. How much would
M pay for the privilege of being the warden? The problem M faces is that prior
to a contract with G being written he has no job security, i.e., if the prison
is publlc there is nothing to stop the bureaucrat from replacing M with another
manager at date O (no relationship-specific investments have yet been made).
Hence N’s future payoff is zero, which means that this is also the politician’s
bribe! The conclusion is that the corrupt politician always wants to privatize
F even if this is socially inefficient.
Even if the politician can force the bureaucrat to retain the manager whom
the politician has selected, the bribes that a politician can extract from this
qanager are lower than those from a private contractor. If A <1, a public
sector warden gets less than 1/2 of the benefits resulting from cost reductions
or quality improvements that he makes, in contrast to a private contractor, who
gets half the gains from quality improvements, and all the gains from costreductions. As a consequence,
would pay for his job is lower
28
the ex ante bribe that a public sector manager
than the bribe that a private contractor would
pay. To the
excessively.
extent that a politician maximizes his bribe, he privatizes
Patronage
An equally important consideration ignoredby assuming that politicians act
in the public interest is that politicians often cater to special interest
groups, such as labor unions, to win elections (Stigler 1971, Becker 1983).
Politicians qay choose to use public money to provide jobs for the workers who
then favor them in the elections, or to pay such workers wages above qarket
levels. If spending public resources to transfer wealth to such interest groups
is easier with in-house provision than with contracting, then politicians would
have a bias toward too little privatization (Shleifer and Vishny 1994).
Patronage thus has the opposite effect
excessive bias toward in-house provision.
in public firms may lead to excessively
to that of corruption: it leads to
Interestingly, excessive employment
high quality (if having qore people
increases quality). For example, the quality of senice in some European state
airlines, such as Air France and Lufthansa, may be excessively high, and a
possibly lower quality at private airlines is no evidence of lower efficiency.
Avoiding excessive public spending on politically powerful interest groups
is indeed one of the principal goals of privatization throughout the world. In
the United States, public sector unions are a powerful special interest group
that has delivered some of the most vocal opposition to government contracting,
including privatization of prisons (AFSCME, 1985). Some evidence suggests that
the presence of strong public sector unions, as well as soft budget constraintsof the government, are
senices in the United
29
important obstacles to privatization of local government
States (Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1996).
Positive considerations thus suggest an important tradeoff between
privatization and inhouse provision, To the extent that corruption is a serious
problem, the case for privatization is weaker than it is under benevolent
government. But to the extent that political patronage is a severe problem, the
case for privatization is stronger. A reformer considering privatization must






Privatization of prisons refers to the contracting out by the government
of the operations of prisons to private companies. In the qiddle ages, prisons
were typically private, but by the 20th century, governments in qost countries
had taken over their operation. In the U.S. today, while private companies by
law are restricted from q eting out punishment, and public employees are usually
present even in private prisons to make decisions on issues that can be
interpreted as changes in the severity of prisoners’ punishment, almost all the
other activities related to incarceration can in principle be privatized,
Private prisons have grown rapidly in the United States in the last decade from
a capacity of about 1200 prisoners in 1985 to almost 50,000 prisoners at the end
of 1994 (Thomas 1995), Still, private prisons house only about 3 percent of the
total prison population. Despite their quantitative insignificance, private
prisons have stimulated an extensive debate addressing the cost and quality
aspects of private incarceration (e.g., AFSCME 1985, Donahue 1988, 1989, bgan30
1990, 1992, Shichor 1995 and others). Although there
of either cost or quality comparisons of public
are no large sample studies
and private prisons, the
available literature is informative enough for us to assess the relevance of the
incomplete contracting approach to the study of prison privatization.
Private prisona are perhaps 10 percent cheaper, per prisoner, than public .
prisons14. The major reason for the lower costs appears to be the roughly 15




difference is that private contractors do not pay the public union
another part is that they hire lover quality workers. Since labor
two thirds of the incarceration costs, the differences in labor
costs can roughly account for the 10 percent cost saving from private prisons.
The most controversial and interesting issues raised by private prisons
concern the quality of senice. Quality covers order in the prisons (security
of prisoners, escapes, staff conduct toward prisoners, violence by guards and
between prisoners, disciplinary procedures etc), amenities that prisoners receive
(q~lity of food, health care, dental care, mental care, clothes, quality of
facilities, prison work, entertainment, access to legal help, etc), and
rehabilitation (vocational training, other education, parole procedures, etc).
Objections to prison privatization typically focus on quality. To quote DiIulio
(1987) , “The history of private sector involvement in corrections isunrelievedly
bleak, a well-documented tale of inmate abuse and political corruption. In many
instances, private contractors worked inmates to death, beat or killed them for
l~e comparisons are often disputed by critics of prison privatization,
since private prisons apparently get somewhat less violent prisoners (Donahue
1988, Shichor 1995), and since some of the costs of private incarceration --
such as the continued need for public oversight -- are often ignored in the
comparison. On the other hand, some of the costs of public prisons, such as
foregone tax revenues and often even capital costs, are also often ignored in
the comparisons.31
minor rule infractions, or failed to provide inmates with the quantity and
quality of life’s necessities (food, clothing, shelter, etc.) specified in their
often meticulously-drafted contracts.” This account is not extreme among those
by critics of private prisons, such as Webb and Webb (1963) and Shichor (1995,
Chapter 2). On the other hand, Logan (1992) reports the results of a suney of
three women’s prisons in New Mexico that point to superior quality of the private
prison. The central question of prison privatization is whether the poor history
is a good guide to the present and the future.
Our theoretical analysis helps organize some of the thinking about prison
privatization around the questions of what contracts can and do accomplish.
Accordingly, we show first that many of the quality problems in incarceration can
actually be addressed through contracts. Nonetheless, we also show that serious





Moreover, the incompleteness takes the form described in the model:
have an opportunity to reduce costs in ways that may lead to a
deterioration of quality. We also address the highly pertinent
corruption and poor enforcement of contracts. We conclude the
section with some tentative recommendations concerning the privatization of
prisons,
What contracts can accomplish
To assess the possibilities of contracting, we examine qodern “best
practice” in the United States, which surely overestimates the average practice.
First, some private prison contracts have obligated the contractor to adhere to
the standards of the American Correctional Association, a pseudo-public body
that issues standards for good prisons (e.g. , ACA 1990) and accredits prisonsthat qeet
proposals
them. Second,
for what a good
32
the American Bar Association has qade a tougher set of
contract should look like (Robbins 1989). Finally, we
briefly examine a real contract between Davidson county in Tennessee and the
Corrections Corporation of American (CCA). The State of Tennessee has taken
contractors in the private prisons




463 standards for adult




correctional institutions dealing with virtually all aspects of prison life. The
standards cover administration and q anagement of prisons (including personnel
policies, staff training and development, bookkeeping, fiscal q anagement, etc.),
physical plant (including building and safety codes, security, inmate housing,
prison size, etc.), operations (including rules and discipline, security
procedures, inmate rights, special confinement, etc.), services (including inmate
classification, food, hygiene, health
programs (work, education, recreation,
Of these standards, thirty eight are
training and staff development, building and safety codes, security and control,
safety and emergency procedures, inmate rights, classification, food senice,
sanitation and hygiene, health care, and work in correctional industries. To get
ACA accreditation, which is renewed every three years, an institution must meet
all thirty eight q andatory standards and ninety percent of the nonmandatory
standards, In general, only a small percentage of either public or private
prisons get ACA accreditation. However, even if a private prison does not get
ACA accreditation, a prison contract can use some or many ACA standards as
contract provisions.
care, social semices, etc.), and inmate
mail, visiting, library, religion, etc.).
mandatory and cover such key issues asACA standards tend
Specifically, ACA standards
33
to be process rather than
typically insist that a facility
outcome oriented,
have a written set
of rules or a policy manual dealing with various qatters, as well as staff to
attend to these matters. ACA standards usually do not specify the content of
these rules. Presumably,
staff, as well as to enable
violated -- something they
matters, however, such as
the i&a of having a manual is to help train prison ,
inmates to complain (or sue) if the w-rittenrules are
could not do without a manual to point to. On some
food and health, ACA does specify qinimum quality
standards that would be relatively difficult to get around. On food, ACA
specifies the number of meals that qust be served, caloric intake, time between
meals, conditions for preparation and keeping of food, as well as palatability.
It also refers to the standards of the American Dietetic Association on food
quality. If a government writes a contract obligating a private contractor to
receive ACA accreditation, it can address qany of the standard quality concerns,
Robbins (1989), in a document endorsed by the American Bar Association,
proposes a tougher approach to contracting
approach is to adhere to ACA standards in
draconian liabilities for contractors who
than that of the ACA. Robbins’
substance, but then to introduce
either violate the contract or
prisoners’ civil rights. For example, Robbins wants private contractors to meet
100 rather than 90 percent of ACA non-mandatory standards. He also wants
contractors to carry $25 qillion of liability insurance per occurrence of
violation of inmate rights, which would perhaps protect the government from
liability, but would almost surely put private prisons out of business.’s
15 Robbins also wants to mandate that private contractors hire the
former employees of facilities previously run by the government at or above
their previous wages. This would eliminate the cost advantage of the private
contractors.34
Robbins’ proposal iS similar to contracting for the highest quality in all states
of the world, which in general is not efficient16.
A look at a 1990 contract between the Corrections Corporation of America
(CCA) on the one hand, and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson
County, Tennessee on the other, suggests that ACA standards can play a pivotal
role in contracting. This contract covers the construction and three years of
operation of a prison by Cm, to be compensated by a fixed construction fee plus
a per diem rate for prisoners, The contract clearly specifies that CCA qust
achieve accreditation of the prison by the ACA within two years of the service
commencement day, and more generally relies very heavily on ACA standards,
particularly in the qatters of amenities and se~ice. The contract also
specifies that three gove~ent employees must be permanently present at the
premises, including the Contract Monitor, in order to monitor contract
performance as well as review disciplinary and appeals reports17.
Overall, the impression conveyedby the ACA standards, Robbins’ proposals,
and the actual contract is that -- if best practice is followed -- qany aspects
of the quality of incarceration can be addressed through contracting.
l%e key assumptions of the qodel of Section 2 -- that quality cannot be
contracted on -- really stands for something qore subtle, namely the idea that
it is too costly to specify the Pfficien t quality level corresponding to every
possible state of the world. It is not a contradiction of the model if -
quality level can be specified in all circumstances; the point is that this
quality level may be too high or too low. Robbins’ (1989) proposal illustrates
this point. His approach can be thought of as an attempt to make quality
contractible. The problem is that it does so by choosing quality so high that
it is arguably uneconomic to supply it, e.g., the prison may be forced to take
so qany precautions to avoid escapes that it cannot make a profit. In other
words, it would be as if someone who wanted a secure house built were to
“solve” the contracting problem by specifying that the house should be
impregnable against all disasters, including nuclear attack. Not
surprisingly, no public prison satisfies Robbins’ criteria.
17Robbins wants public employees to play a more active role in discipline
and appeals than the Tennessee contract envisions.35
Contractual Incompleteness
Although contracts can address some quality issues, in several important
areas incompleteness is evident, and can in principle compromise the quality of
eiervice&livered by a private contractor, The
on are use of force and quality of personnel.
of much of the criticisms of private prisons.
two crucial areas we concentrate
These areas have been the focus
In both of these areas, “best
practice” contracts appear to be seriously incomplete in ways that can easily
lead to quality deterioration,
A famous court case, Hedina v. O’Neill (1984), illustrates the persistent
concerns about both the excessive use of force and the poor quality of personnel
in private prisons. According to Shichor (1995),”In 1981, in Houston, 26
stowaways were detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. At first,
20 of the detainees were held at the local jail and 6 of them were placed with
a local private security firm. The private firm placed them in a cell designed
to hold six people. A day later 10 of the 20 detainees held in the jail also
were transferred to the private firm for custody, and they were placed in the
same cell, which was already filled to its capacity (bgan, 1990). In this
situation 16 illegal immigrants were held in a
day after the transfer of the 10 aliens to the
tried to escape from the facility and a private
the escape accidentally killed one of them with
12 ft by 20 ft holding cell. A
private facility, the detainees
guard in his attempt to prevent
a shotgun and seriously wounded
another one. The private guard apparently was untrained in the use of firearms,
and his intention was to use his gun as a cattle prod to force the detainees back
to their cell (p. 104).” Interestingly, when ruling on this case, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals overturneda lower court ruling against the INS and held
that “(1) INS officials had no statutory duty to provide appropriate detention36
facilities for excludable aliens, and (2) aliens’ due process rights were not
violated” (Logan 1990, p. 183). In short, guards can use excessive force, guards
may be untrained, and still courts see no violation of law (or contract). AFSCME
(1985) and Donahue (1988) offer additional examples of the poor training and low
human capital of private prison personnel.
An examination of other sources on contracts points to significant
incompleteness. The q andatory ACA standardon the use of force is not especially
detailed: “Written policy, procedure, and practice restrict the use of physical
force to instances of justifiable self-defense, protection of others, protection
of property, and prevention of escapes, and then only as a last resort and in
accordance with appropriate statutory authority. In no event is physical force
justifiable as punishment. A written report is prepared following all uses of
force and is submitted to administrative staff for review.” A separate, but
equally vague, mandatory standard governs the use of firearms. Even the Robbins
suggestion on the use of non-deadly force is brief: “any jailer shall be
authorized to use only such non-deadly force as circumstances require in the
following situations: to prevent the commission of a felony or misdemeanor,
including escape; to defend oneself or others against physical assault; to
prevent serious damage to property; to enforce institutional regulations and
orders; and to prevent or quell a riot.mla Robbins is tougher on contractors
In some respects (damage to property has to be serious), although he opens a very
wide door for the use of force by allowing the contractor “to enforce
institutional regulations and orders’ , which covers just about anything. These
‘aSpecifying the circumstances when the use of @-. force is allowed is
typically easier, since such force is normally used only in the event of
escapes and riots, both of which are verifiable. See Shichor (1995, p. 101)
for a discussion.37
standards suggest to us that, whether the contractor Is ACA accredited or even
restrained by the w, his discretion in the use of non-deadly force is enormous.
The Tennessee contract allows even wider latitude in the use of force.





Second, in the use of non-deadly force, the Tennessee contract
recommendations (without specifying his penalties), which
restrict the use of force in significant ways. In sum, even
contract allows wide latitude in the use of force.






of personnel. The ACA (non-mandatory) standards require that a procedure
to determine staffing needs, and that the vacancy rate be kept under 10
for any 18 qonth period. Correctional officers are also required to
120 hours of training in their first year, and 40 hours in subsequent
Little is said about the quality of
covered) or the quality of the officers,
standards. The Tennessee contract follows
specifies that “at the time the facility opens
the training (except for topics
Robbins generally follows ACA
the ACA on training, but also
and during the first year of the
contract, a minimum of 25 percent of contractor’ s security employees will have
at least one year of corrections security experience. Davidson County residents
will be given a hiring preference in staffing the facility” . What is qost
interesting about these standards is how few there are, and how much discretion
the contractor has in saving costs on personnel.
Does contractual incompleteness lead to the deterioration of quality?
Unfortunately, no systematic evidence is available on this matter. We can get
a glimpse of the issues by looking at two (very small sample) reports. The first
is a comparative evaluation of two public prisons and one private (CCA-managed)38
prison in Tennessee, done by that state’s government (State of Tennessee 1995).
Although this evaluation has concluded that all three prisons are overall of
extremely hi@ quality, with the implication that a cheaper private prison is a
good deal for the state (see also the NYT, 9/19/1995), it is clear from the body
of the report that the level of violence is higher in the private prison: “The
number of injuries to staff and prisoners is a measure of the security and safety
of the facility. During the fifteen qonth period, the private prison reported
significantly qore (214) injuries to prisoners and staff, compared to 21 and 51
for the two state prisons, respectively. The private prison also reported 30
incidents of the use of force, compared to 4 and 6, respectively, for the state
prisons” . The Temessee report minimizes this evidence because of the possible
differences in reporting practices, but it is suggestive nonetheless.
All three Tennessee prisons had ACA accreditation. However, they did not
qeet 100 percent of non-man&tory ACA standards, and the areas in which the
prisons failed to qeet the standards were different for the private and public
prisons. One of the public prisons seems to have been qost lacking in meeting
food senice standards: it met only 44 percent of them on the first inspection
and 67 on the second. The second state prison qet only 64 percent of fire and
occupational safety standards on the first inspection, although it was up to 97
percent in the second inspection. The private prisonon the first inspection had
the largest problem with personnel standards, of which it met only 73 percent,
and with food senice, where it met 67 percent of standards. It also had
problems with health care, health records, and mental health senice standards,
where it had about 75 percent compliance. By the time of the second inspection,
the private prison was up to 92 percent compliance on personnel standards (still
below state prisons), and had straightened out most of its other failures. It39
iS difficult to
look exemplary
gauge from the report whether the reason that the three prisons
on the second inspection is that they were expecting the
evaluation. However, the inferior performance of the private prison on personnel
matters is consistent with the view that the area of personnel is where the non-
contractible savings lie in private prison management, The higher incidence of
violence in the private prison might well be a consequence of inferior staff,
since undertrained guards may be more likely to use force to prevent violence
between inmates.
CCA private prisons in Tennessee are widely regarded as a success of
private prison q anagement. ESHOR’S detention facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey,
operated for the Immigration and Naturalization SeNice (INS), is widely regarded
as a failure, in part because a riot broke out at that facility on June 18, 1995.
The highly critical INS report on this facility, as well as newspaper accounts,
provide some additional information about a private prison -- although we should
stress that this piece of evidence might represent the worst case. The facility
housed foreign nationals who were caught attempting to enter the US illegally
through Kennedy and Newark airports, and who were awaiting deportation -- not
exactly a hard core criminal crowd. ESMOR won the INS contract by significantly
underbidding another private competitor, in part because it assumed in its bid
lower wage rates for prison staff. The contract actually specified the t~es of
workers that ESHOR was supposed to hire, but it turned out to be possible within
the contract to hire as guards individuals who previously guarded goods in
warehouses . With training, ESMOR evidently just violated the contract: the INS
reports that ESMOR “did not qeet requirements of the contract= in this area,
Overall, the ESMOR facility was seriously understaffed, guards did not
receive enough training, guards were implicated in incidents of physical abuse40
of prisoners, and supenision of staff by management was lacking. When the riot
broke out, the guards immediately ran away, and called the police from a
payphone. INS attributed manyof the problems at the facility to ESMOR’S cutting
corners, principally on labor. The evidence in the report points to the
possibility of cost savings by private contractors at the expense of quality,
although this particular episode raises the equally important issue of
gOve~nt’f3 failure to respond to explicit contract violations by the
contractor.
In sum, while systematic evidence on the quality of incarceration by
private and public prisons is not available, the existing shreds of evidence
suggest that in important dimensions, such as prison violence and the quality of
personnel, prison contracts are seriously incomplete. This incompleteness can,
and evidently sometimes does, give rise to quality shortfalls in private
contracting.
Contract Supervision and Oversight
Our discussion so far has stuck to the qodel of a benevolent government
writing and enforcing a contract, limited only by the difficulties of writing
good contracts. The history of private incarceration, however (like quch of the
rest of history of government), points to the co~on incidence of corruption in
allocating contracts, as well as to deficient contract enforcement. Shichor
(1995), for example, tells a disquieting tale of corruption and prisoner
qaltreatment in private prisons in California in the 19th century. The first
private prison contract went to Jemes Estell, a politically powerful qember of
the legislature, who used his authority to enrich himself and his friends with
lucrative subcontracts while abusing prisoners (Shichor, 1995, p. 40). How does41
the present practice compare with the past7
The examination of ESMOR and other evidence indicates that the issues
analyzed in Section 5 remain germane to actual prison contracting. First, private
prison companies are very active politically. For instance, ESMOR evidently
lobbies politicians and makes political contributions to receive contracts (New
York Times, 7/23/1995). The wife of Tennessee governor -r Alexander invested
early and profitably in the stock of Corrections Corporation of Merica, which
subsequently got Involved very deeply in the privatization of Tennessee prisons
with the governor’s endorsement (The New Republic, 3/4/96, p. 9).
Second, contract enforcement cannot be taken for granted. The INS report
concludes that ESMOR’s changes in policies “hindered INS ability to effectively
perform its oversight functions” . The report also notes that ESMOR told its
guards not to share information with the INS officials working on the premises,
and in one instance encouraged the INS to reassign an officer who complained
about the performance of the Elisabeth, N.J. facility several months prior to the
riot. The report indicates that ESMOR violated the contract in some instances,
and also pursued policies preventing INS from enforcing the contract. But it is
also clear from the report that INS did not do what it could to enforce this
contract, The INS report vividly illustrates how a government bureaucracy with
relatively weak incentives has trouble enforcing a contract with a private
supplier determined to reduce its costs, even if this involves violations of the
contract and not just the issues on which the contract is silent.
Third, the INS contract imposed no or light penalties for performance
failures (e.g., as far as we can tell, $80 as a penalty for an escape, of which
there were dozens from the start), and was generally extremely soft compared, for
example, to the Tennessee contracts. ESMOR is even negotiating with the INS42
about the resumption of operations in the Elizabeth, N.J. , facility. The costs
of contract violations to the private contractor, therefore, do not appear to be
very high.
In the case of prisons, then, the benevolent government perspective might
give an excessively optimistic picture of private contracting.
Should prisons be privatized?
Prisons seem to fit reasonably well into our framework. Although in some
respects prison contracts are very detailed, they are still seriously incomplete.
There are significant opportunities for cost reduction that do not violate the
contracts. These cost reductions, at least in principle, can lead to a
substantial deterioration of quality, Moreover, from the available evidence we
have the impression that the world may not be far from the assumptions of
proposition 4. First, the welfare consequences of quality deterioration might
be of the s-e magnitude as those of cost reduction. Second, the opportunities
for quality innovation are limited. Under these conditions, proposition 4
suggests that public ownership is superior. That is, private contractors qay
seriously reduce quality in the process of reducing costs, and, qoreover, the
benefits from the potential quality innovation by the private contractors are
limited. We also note that, without prisoner choice, ex post compet~t~on, which
addresses the quality problems that qay result from privatization of other
activities, does not play a large role in incarceration. Finally, corruption
seems to be a more severe problem in this business than patronage, since the
union premium as of this writing is not large. For all these reasons, our theory
suggests significant skepticism about private incarceration.
One instance in which the case against prison privatization is even43
stronger is maximum security prisons, where the prevention
prisoners against guards and other prisoners is one of the qost
of incarceration (~ew Yor~es , November 26, 1995).




of force by the
guards. We have shown that it is very difficult to delineate contractually the
permissible circumstances for the use of such force. Moreover, hiring less
educated guarda and undertraining them -- which private prisons have a strong
incentive to do -- can encourage the unwarranted use of force by the guards. As
a result, our arguments suggest that maximum security prisons should not be
privatized as long as limiting the use of force against prisoners is an important




(1995) census of private adult correctional institutions in theU.S.
security. In contrast, private halfway houses and youth correctional
where violence problems are much less serious, are extremely common
(Shichor 1995).
6. Other activities.
In some ways, the model we presented was constructed to fit prisons.
However, our model helps us to analyze other activities as well, as we show in
this section. In the process, we also examine some of the qodel’s limitations.
Garbage Collection
Garbage collection illustrates a case where our model clearly points to the
benefits of privatization. In this case, the damage to quality resulting from
the private contractor hiring inferior employees or failing to maintain the
equipment is probably trivial (b(e) is low). Our analysis then implies that44
private provision is superior. This result obtains even though in garbage
collection ex post competition is extremely expensive, since it iS essential that
the same company pick up garbage from neighboring houses (Donahue 1989). The
superiority of private provision in garbage collection is documented by several
empirical studies (Donahue 1989).
Weapons Procurement
Weapons procurement is another case where our model points to the
superiority of private provision. Although the damage to quality from cost
reduction might be significant, to a large extent this damage couldbe contracted
around, since weapons qust qeet well-specified performance requirements ,
Moreover, quality innovation is enormously important in weapons design, and the
incentives of private suppliers are probably significantly stronger than those
of public employees. As a consequence, ifb(e) canbe limited through contracts,
Proposition 3 points to the superiority of private ownership,
Foreign Policy
In qany situations, the nature of the senice that the government wants to
be performed is extremely complex and unpredictable, so any contract is
inherently extremely incomplete. Most actual decisions of the contractor have
to be renegotiated at the government’s initiative, which exposes the government
to the high costs of paying up to the contractor who has a lot of power. For
example, as Wilson (1989) shows, it is virtually impossible to describe in
advance what semices need to be performed to carry out American foreign policy,
a task now assigned to the State Department. Suppose that the State Department
were to be privatized, and a set of policies toward different countries specifiedin the contract. In this case,
toward a country (say because
pursuade the private contractor
the government presumably would
45
when the government wants to change its policy
Russia renounces communism), it would have to
to change what it does. In this renegotiation,
have to pay the private contractor more than it
would pay an employee, who is totally replaceable when no ex
needed. Inhouse provision in this case of few investments
holdup opportunities seems clearly superior,
ante investments are
and enormous ex post
A skeptic can respond to this analysis by suggesting that perhaps ex ante,
the government should auction off the foreign policy contract for a vast amount




wrong with this arrangement? In our theory, we have assumed that M is
enough to pay up front for the right to own F when private ownership is
However, in some cases, such as the conduct of
not be wealthy enough. This creates a further argument for
H’s ex post holdup power vastly exceeds the amount he can
foreign policy, M may
public ownership when
raise ex ante for the
contract, If M cannot compensate G in advance for all the future holdups when
G changes the contract, then the extraction of surplus from G by M is socially
wasteful. Hence the government may wish to own F simply to avoid having to
compensate H when it changes its
the conclusion that foreign policy
l~is argument is developed
mind at date 1’9.
shouldbe conducted
This logic thus confirms
by government bureaucrats.
further in Trinh (1996). One may ask why M
couldn’t borrow against the receipts from his future hold-up opportunitie~.
The answer Is that a bank qay be unwilling to lend to M, since there is
nothing to stop M from “holding up” the bank by refusing to hold up the
government. That is, having received his loan, M can threaten not to hold up
the government at tite 1 and use this threat to renegotiate downwards his
repayment to the bank (Hart and Moore 1994), Anticipating this, the bank will
refuse to lend to M.46
Schools
An important example that goes outside of our basic qodel is the provision
of schooling. For schools, the damage to quality from cost cutting, b(e), may
be large, but innovation is probably important and the incentives of publicly
employed teachers, especially when they are protected by unions, are weak. Our
propositions, therefore, do not give a clear answer as to which arrangement is
superior. The key aspect of schools, however, is the potential for ex post
competition. In voucher arrangements combined with school choice, for example,
the government pays for each child’s education, but children and parents can
select schools. While we have not analyzed our qodel in this case in detail, our
conjecture is that the case for such private arrangements is extremely strong.
School choice would force private schools to compete for students by providing
higher quality, since schools cannot compete in prices when students pay with
vouchers. This competition should significantly reduce the incentive to cut
quality while cutting costs, as well as increase the incentive to innovate
quality. Indeed, the available evidence seems to suggest that competition
between schools is associated with a higher quality of education (Hoxby 1994).
Critics of vouchers and school choice often point to a particular aspect
of quality that they believe would fall as a result of privatization, namely
reduction of access of some students to good education. Specifically, critics
fear that sorting of students by ability would increase as a result of such
arrangements , which they regard as socially undesirable. Such sorting can take
two forms. First, good private schools paid with vouchers would select the best
students, leaving the not-as-good students to not-as-good schools. Second,
private schools would avoid expensive to educate children altogether, who would
then get stuck in residual government programs. Critics charge that such47
outcomes are less socially desirable than those involving less sorting. Some
school districts have tried to solve these sorting problems contractually by, for
example, using courts to allocate students to private schools that wish to be
paid with vouchers (tie, ed. 1995). Whether contracts can successfully address
the concerns of the critics of school choice, and whether these concerns are
actually justified from the social welfare viewpoint, are question requiring
further inquiry.
Healthcare
In the case of healthcare,
for the senices of at least
as with education, the government wants to pay
some consumers, and needs to design a good
arrangement for doing so. One aspect of this design concerns whether hospitals
should be private or public. In the analysis of optimal ownership, there are
some similarities between schools and hospitals, as well as some differences.
To begin, fn healthcare, as in education, gains from innovation are enormous, but
so is the damage to quality from cost-cutting. Moreover, the distributional
aspect of quality is extremely important in both services: the danger that
expensive-to-treat consumers would be denied care if the
than it costs to treat them is always present.
he further similarity is that ex post competition
government pays less
between hosptials --
letting patients choose their hospital -- can play a role in healthcare, and we
argued above such competition may strengthen the case for privatization.
However, a crucial difference is the limited ability of consumers to assess the
quality of healthcare they receive. Consmers generally cannot tell whether
hospitals have failed to provide care to save costs, and hence would not as






private ownership and competition would not be nearlyas effective
as in education, q aking the case for some government ownership
because of all these concerns about private
responded to the need to provide healthcare to
provision, most
all their people
through government provision. The United States has been different in relying
on both private and public hospitals, with the latter taking care primarily of
indigent patients. Historically, private hospitals have been paid on the cost
plus basis -- an approach that our qodel does not accommodate (since we assume
that costs are nonverifiable) but which, unsurprisingly, has proved extremely
expensive. More recently, the form of compensating providers has shifted to
fixed fees for serv~ces, a contract very similar to that analyzed in our model.
Not surprisingly, these contracts have increased concerns about quality
deterioration, particularly in the so-called Health Maintenance Organizations.
An analysis of healthcare would require a significant generalization of our
model, especially since verification of costs and cost-plus contracts have played
an essential role in paying for this senice. This is a very important topic for
future research.
Police and Armed Forces
As our last example, we consider some basic se~ices provided by the
government that nobody seriously thinks of privatizing: the police and the armed
forces. Our framework helps to explain why these senices should not be
privatized.
If the police or armed
private companies would have
forces were privatized, the owners of the resulting
enormous power. Part of this power would stem from49
the direct ownership of weapons that are currently in public hands. The owners
could use this power to hold up the government and society. For example, suppose
as an extreme case that nuclear weapons were sold off to a private company and
an (incomplete) contract was written with the company as to how these weapons
should be used in the event that the country is threatened with attack. The
concern is obviously that the private company would wriggle out of the incomplete
contract and either threaten to withhold the weapons in the event of an emergency
to extract a huge side-payment from the government, or
weapons against the country itself unless it receives
We stress that keeping the nuclear stockpiles --
does not eliminate the possibility of attempted holdup.
even threaten to use the
such a side-payment.
or armed forces -- public
A general who is a state
employee could use his access to nuclear weapons to attempt to hold up society.
After all, coups and rebellions by the armed forces do sometimes occur. However,
there is a difference between the private and public cases. If nuclear weapons
or the armed forces are publicly controlled, the government can take early action
to prevent a potential holdup. If it suspects that an errant general is engaged
in treasonous activities, it can fire the general. In contrast, in the private
case, it would have to wait until a clear breach of contract occurred; this qight
be too late. In our
all times, whereas a
costly to replace.
model, a public general can be kept replaceable almost at
private M can qake substantial investments to make himself
7. Conclusion.
We have examined the conditions that determine the relative efficiency of
inhouse provision vs outside contracting of government services. Our
theoretical arguments suggest that the case for inhouse provision is generally50
stronger when non-contractible cost reductions have large deleterious effects on
quality , when quality imovations are unimportant, and when corruption in
government procurement is a severe problem, In contrast, the case for
privatization is stronger when quality-reducing cost reductions canbe controlled
through contract or competition, when quality innovations are important, and when
patronage and powerful uions are a severe problem inside the government.
We then applied this analysis to several government activities using the
available evidence on the importance of various factors. We concluded that the
case for inhouse provision is very strong in such senices as the conduct of
foreign policy and maintenance of police and armed forces, but also can be qade
reasonably persuasively for prisons. In contrast, the case for privatization is
strong in such activities as garbage collection and weapons production, but also
can be made reasonably persuasively for schools. In some other senices, such




deal more complicated and requires a much qore detailed model of
and regulation
future work.
than we could provide in this paper. We defer such51
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